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Abstract
A growing literature examines adverse behavior as unintended consequences of
incentives. We test Lazear’s hypothesis that states that if rewards were
dependent solely on relative performance then an increase in rewards would
induce agents to engage in sabotage activity to reduce rivals’ output. We test this
hypothesis using the natural experiment of a rule change in Spanish football, the
increase in points for winning a league match from two to three. We find,
consistent with Lazear’s hypothesis, that teams in a winning position were more
likely to commit offences punishable by dismissal of a player after this change.
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Introduction
A growing literature examines unintended consequences of incentives that may be
perverse in that the resulting behavior may have adverse effects. For example, teach-
ers may cheat when schools are rewarded for high student test scores (Jacob &
Levitt, 2003). Lazear (1989) developed a theoretical model where agents may
respond to increased incentives by taking actions that reduce rivals’ output. A key
precondition for this result is that rewards depend solely on relative performance.
Testing for sabotage in the workplace is extremely difficult. First, both employers
and workers will understandably be reluctant to acknowledge that sabotage exists.
Second, evidence of reduced performance may be consistent with a variety of expla-
nations including mechanical failure and isolating the effects of sabotage will be dif-
ficult. Third, in standard work situations, natural experiments involving changes in
incentives are hard to find. These difficulties have led several researchers to use
sports leagues as useful settings in which to analyze changes in behavior following
changes in incentives. Sports leagues are based on a set of fixtures (games) which are
played under well-specified rules that are applied by a set of match officials (refer-
ees, umpires). The direct rewards of a game are points or wins that are accumulated
as the fixture schedule unfolds during a season. Less directly, teams gain revenues
from the games that they participate in and they may also gain revenues from the
final league standings, especially if they win the Championship title. Rewards in
sports matches are relative—if one team wins, the other loses—as required by
Lazear’s theory of sabotage.
We will assume that sabotage in football matches is related to actions beyond
legal limits to avoid an opponent’s objective. This mainly includes either unlawful
or unfair behavior against opponents and wasting time. These are liable to be pun-
ished by the referee if he (or his assistants) witnesses an infraction and considers
sanctions to be appropriate under the Laws of the Game. Punishments include yel-
low and red cards. A yellow card is a formal warning (caution) that will imply a
sending-off (i.e., a red card) if a second yellow card is awarded. However, aggressive
behavior, defined as either violent conduct or serious foul play, will be punished
with a direct red card that implies a straight sending-off (dismissal of the player from
the field of play). Obviously, players may try to commit these actions without being
observed by the referee; hence, they can be labeled as sabotage actions.1 The only
observable signals of this kind of sabotage are either yellow or red cards. In doing
so, we are assuming that there is a direct relationship between the total illegal actions
(both observed and unobserved by the referees) and those which are actually pun-
ished by the referees. In line with Lazear’s model, we analyze whether the change
in the victory award rule has induced behavioral changes of the player concerning
illegal actions.
One strand of the literature focuses on rules changes within sports and also the
application of rules by match officials. In North American ice hockey (the National
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Hockey League), Allen (2002), Levitt (2002), and Heckelman and Yates (2003) ask
whether adding an extra referee in a random subset of games had an deterrent impact
on number of infractions committed by players. It appears that increasing the num-
ber of referees did not induce players to commit fewer recorded fouls. In English
football, Witt (2005) finds that the number of expulsions (red cards) of players did
not increase following a rule change in 1998 to make a tackle from behind a player
worthy of dismissal. Numbers of cautions (for less severe infractions) rose, however,
suggesting that players substituted one type of illegal activity for another. Rickman
and Witt (2008) find that discretionary time added on by referees in English football
(for injuries, substitutions, and other disruptions) fell when home teams were behind
in score following a change in referee compensation method toward full-time salary
rather than payment per match officiated. Previously, Garicano, Palacios-Huerta,
and Prendergast (2005) had shown that in Spanish football referees added dispropor-
tionately more discretionary time on for injuries and other disturbances in play for
home teams that were behind in score in close games. This result was not found for
games that are not close. Such results were described in the title of their paper as
‘‘favouritism under social pressure.’’ Similar results were found by Sutter and
Kocher (2004) using data from the German Bundesliga.
The National Hockey League instituted a new points regime in the 1999/2000
season. Concerned that a high ratio of tied games might be deterring audiences, in
a continent where drawn games are rare (American Football) or impossible (Base-
ball and Basketball), the League decided to reward a team losing at the end of 5 min
extra time (overtime) one point, as opposed to zero for a loss in regulation time. But
Abrevaya (2004) reports that, although the incidence of tied games fell, the propor-
tion of games going into overtime rose as an unintended effect of the change in
incentives.
The focus of this article is the radical change in points incentive introduced in
English football in 1981 and installed later, in 1995, in other European football lea-
gues. We shall examine the case of the Spanish league. The winning team in a Span-
ish football match received two points up to the 1995/1996 season. From this point
on, three league points were earned by the winning team. The rules of a single point
for a tie and zero points for a defeat remained as before. The purpose behind this
change was to encourage more attacking football that would be more attractive to
fans. However, Brocas and Carrillo (2004) developed a game-theoretic model to
show that if the value of a victory increases, then teams will rationally adopt a more
offensive strategy to break a stalemate later in the match. But weaker teams will also
adopt a more defensive strategy at the beginning of a match to avoid being led early
(and to frustrate the supposedly superior opposition). This leaves the team the option
of trying to break the tie later in the game when the opponent has little time left in
which to retaliate. Therefore, the theory predicts that, on average, teams will play
more defensively when the points per win rise from two to three. For Portugal,
Correira-Guedes and Machado (2002) offer empirical evidence that, although teams
favored to win (by the betting market) scored more goals after the rule change,
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underdog teams (usually the away side) defended to a greater extent than before and
scored fewer goals. For England, Palacios-Huerta (2004) searched for structural
breaks in a long time series for a set of team performance indicators. The points
change in 1982 led to a structural break in variability of goals scored but with no
change in mean goals per match. This is consistent with increased defensive effort
offsetting any increase in attacking effort. For Germany, Dilger and Geyer (2009)
find that, under the three points for win regime, winning teams adopt a more defen-
sive strategy resulting in fewer shots on goal by both the winning and losing team.
Finally, Haugen (2008) developed a theoretical model which implies that the three
points reward induces lower competitive balance in a league and they tested this
hypothesis using data from the United Kingdom, Norway, and Romania.
An increase in defensive effort could follow a change in points per win partly
because the cost of going behind in a game is increased but also because teams that
go one goal ahead may be more inclined to protect their lead rather than increase it.
We predict that a rise in defensive effort will spill over to some extent into illegal
activity and that, in turn, the likelihood of a team receiving at least one dismissal
is raised. This argument has been advanced for Spanish football by Garicano &
Palacios-Huerta (2006) but their analysis focuses on the more trivial cautionary (yel-
low card) offenses. In contrast, we analyze the effect of the three points rule on red
cards. Red cards, by reducing number of players on the team, have a bigger impact
on game outcomes than yellow cards.2 Due to this larger impact on the results, red
cards have a higher expected cost for the team. Hence, any significant increase in
their number should be related with a rise of the expected benefits of those actions
that raise the probability of being punished. As long as our data set captures an ade-
quate natural experiment that keeping other thing unchanged but the relative incen-
tives of a match victory, we are confident that the change in the average number of
red cards per match is related with changes in the incentives, achieving new evi-
dence in favor of Lazear’s hypothesis.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section describes the data
and the empirical model. Section Empirical Results presents the empirical results.
Section Conclusions concludes.
Data and Empirical Model
Our data are taken from the 1994/1995 and 1995/1996 seasons of the Spanish First
Division. This comprised 20 teams in 1994/1995 and 22 in 1995/1996. Teams played
each other twice during a season, once at home and once away. The choice of adja-
cent seasons needs some clarification. Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2006) used
data from the 1994/1995 and 1998/1999 seasons to test the effect of the points
change in 1995 on fouls, cautions (yellow cards), and offensive effort. Their use
of data from the 1998/1999 season is designed to allow for gradual adjustment of
teams and players to the new points incentive. In contrast, we argue that behavior
246 Journal of Sports Economics 11(3)
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adjusts quickly as new information flows rapidly in football and a team offering a
distinct strategy to deal with the new incentives would be quickly imitated. One
advantage of using adjacent seasons is that similar teams (apart from promotion and
relegation) and similar players appear in each season. This consistency in personnel
would not be so apparent for seasons that are some time apart. In addition, the two
seasons that we select did not have any other rule changes and hence we are
confident that the points change is the major change in incentives at that time. In
contrast, the 1998/1999 season saw the introduction of an International Federation
of Association Football (FIFA) rule change to render the ‘‘tackle from behind’’ an
offence worthy of dismissal (Witt, 2005). Use of data from this season would con-
flate the points incentive effect with a rule-of-game effect.
Our data come mainly from the referees’ official postmatch reports, which can be
viewed on the Spanish Professional Football League Web site (www.lfp.es). Specif-
ically, the information include the name of the teams (i.e., home and away), the min-
ute of sending-offs, the minute of each goal, and the referee’s name. Moreover, we
obtain public attendance of each match from Garcı´a and Rodrı´guez (2002). The main
advantage of our database is that we control for the score of the match so we are able
to study the change in the behavior of players under different match scorelines.
Some previous studies of biased behavior of referees and of impacts of rules changes
on referee behavior have been limited by reliance on pregame covariates and a lack
of controls for within-game events such as changes in score (see Buraimo, Forrest, &
Simmons, IN PRESS; Simmons, 2008, for critical reviews).
The main purpose of the article is to test the sabotage hypothesis proposed by
Lazear (1989) in a sports league setting. The hypothesis states that if teams face
an increased relative value of winning, they will be more prone to commit sabotage.
Table 1 presents the numbers of dismissals per match for a given team according to
the different game states (winning, drawing, and losing) in each season and in total.
It can be seen that the worse the state of the match for a team, the larger number of
red cards in each season.3 This could be explained by the fact that teams which are
behind in score generate extra effort on scoring so as to negate the deficit and some
of this extra effort will translate into illegal activity. However, the number of
sending-offs per match that took place in the 1995/1996 season increased signifi-
cantly from the 1994/1995 season. However, this change was not the same for the
three feasible game states. Actually, there was a decrease in the number of red cards
Table 1. Sending-Offs Per Match
1994/1995 1995/1996 Total
Loss 0.20 0.16 0.18
Draw 0.12 0.16 0.14
Win 0.07 0.13 0.10
Total 0.39 0.45 0.42
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per match when teams were behind, but there was a slight increase for drawing and a
large increase when teams were winning. Hence, teams which were ahead performed
more punishable actions (in number and in scale of illegality) with a reward of three
points compared to the two points reward. This is consistent with the conjecture that
when teams are ahead they tend to place more effort into defensive actions so as to
protect their lead in the three points reward than in two points. Some of this extra
defensive effort spills over into illegal actions punishable by dismissal. Thus, we
have obtained some preliminary descriptive evidence for our hypothesis. However,
the results from Table 1 could be misleading because, for instance, the likelihood of
a draw could be lower in the first season than in the second one. Also, we do not
know whether dismissals affected game score or the reverse or indeed both. Thus,
to identify effects of the incentive change in the next section, we are going to esti-
mate probit models with appropriate control variables, including within-game
covariates.
We define two different approaches by using two different units of observation.
First, we define the observation as the period of time within a match in which the
state of the match (win, draw, or loss) remains unchanged. We label this as the ‘‘con-
stant state of match specification.’’ Hence, for each period of time in which the result
remains unchanged, there are two observations (i.e., one for the local team and other
one for the away team). It is important to stress that we consider that the result is
changed only if either a draw is converted into a winning or losing position or a win
is converted into a draw. Therefore, because the period in which teams are ahead or
behind is considered the same observation, it is unknown whether a team is winning
or losing by only one goal or more goals. The observation does not change if a team
goes from one goal ahead to two goals ahead and, thus, our unit of observation has
varying time duration. This choice of time-varying unit of observation cannot be
considered very restrictive in a low scoring game such as football. However, to avoid
possible shortcomings, we also use the minute of a game as an alternative unit of
observation, which we label as ‘‘minute by minute specification.’’4 In particular, this
measure allows us to control for the difference in goals between teams during a
match. We expect that the greater the difference, the lower will be the number of
sending-offs. Indeed, some evidence in support of this hypothesis is offered by Bur-
aimo et al. (IN PRESS) in their probit model of dismissals in English Premier Lea-
gue and German Bundesliga that uses a minute of game unit of observation.
Our dependent variable takes value one when there is at least a sending-off for the
team considered in the observation and zero otherwise. The empirical models
include three types of variable: pregame control variables for team and game char-
acteristics, time of observation, and within-game controls for state of the match.
The first set of variables controls for team and match features which could affect
the importance of the match for both teams. Player behavior can be affected by such
circumstances. We nominate a particular set of rivalrous games (RIVALRY) that
include derby matches played between two teams close in distance to each other but
extended to allow for matches that are known to be of high intensity (i.e., Real
248 Journal of Sports Economics 11(3)
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Madrid vs. F. C. Barcelona and F. C. Barcelona vs. Atle´tico de Madrid). We predict
that these matches will have a higher probability of dismissal for each team.5 More-
over, the extent of social pressure exerted by fans may be related to size of crowd.
We proxy crowd intensity by match attendance (ATTENDANCE). We should note
that Dawson, Dobson, Goddard, and Wilson (2007) and Buraimo et al. (IN PRESS)
each tested the impact of gate attendance on disciplinary sanctions in English foot-
ball and could not find a significant effect. In addition, we include a dummy variable
for the home team (HOME). This variable could reflect referee bias but also could
reflect the different playing strategies of home and away teams within a match.
Hence, the coefficient of this variable must be interpreted cautiously.
The second set of variables controls for time and length of observation. Figure 1
shows the histogram of the minute in which the player dismissals took place.
We can see that the number of sending-offs increases with match time, and this
should be taken into account in the empirical specification. There are several reasons
that can explain the time pattern in Figure 1. First, an increasing function of prob-
ability of red card over time seems reasonable, because the majority of red cards are
due to double yellow cards (56% in our sample). Moreover, it is likely that referees
were more reluctant to expel players in the beginning of the match because this deci-
sion could have a larger impact on the match result (see Caliendo & Radic, 2006;
Ridder, Cramer, & Hopstaken, 1994; Torgler, 2004).
Thus, we include several variables that are designed to control the timing of each
observation. In particular, in the ‘‘constant state of match specification,’’ we intro-
















Figure 1. Histogram of player expulsions through time.
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(TIME2). We expect a positive coefficient on the former variable. In addition, we
control for the fact that the number of sending-offs increases along the match time,
as shown in Figure 1. To do so, we include the minute in which the observation starts
(PBEGIN). Furthermore, we also include a dummy variable that takes value one if
the observation belongs to the last 10 min of the match (DMEND) and a dummy
variable that takes value one if the observation belongs to the beginning of the match
(DMBEGIN). Because the beginning of the match is always tied, the latter variable
should be interpreted as the difference with the DRAWING variable at the beginning
of the match. Moreover, we include an interactive term between DMEND with the
dummy for the season 1995/1996 (D9596END) to test whether the number of expul-
sions is higher in the ending of the match in the second season as we expect. In the
‘‘minute by minute specification,’’ besides DMEND and D9596END, we include
dummies for the 45 (D45) and 90 (D90) minutes because those minutes are also
reflecting the extra time added on by the referee on both halves of the match. Finally,
we also include dummies for minute intervals of 15 min.
The final category of control variables refers to the different likelihood that a
sending-off took place according to the state of the match. To establish suitable con-
trols, we include a dummy variable if the team is winning (WIN) and another one if
the team is losing (LOSS). Hence, the draw is the omitted variable. As explained
above, we expect that there will be a decrease in size of the coefficients when the
game state is better for a given team.
To test our primary hypothesis of increased sabotage activity as the reward to
winning increased, we include the variables LOSS and WIN interacted with a
dummy that takes the value of one for the season 1995/1996 (D9596LOSS,
D9596WIN). These variables reflect the difference in the behavior of teams between
the two seasons for each feasible result. We expect that the sign of D9596WIN
would be positive because the winning teams are more encouraged to defend the
result in the 1995/1996 season than in the previous one. Moreover, to control for the
existence of an overall season effect regardless of the result, we also estimate
another model including only a dummy variable for the season 1995/1996,
D9596, instead of D9596LOSS and D9596WIN. Additionally, in the ‘‘minute by
minute specification,’’ we are able to control for the difference in score between
teams in the previous minute. Hence, we include the variables RESWIN9596 and
RESLOST9596 which are the interactions between the result defined as the differ-
ence in goals of the observation team and the opponent, the dummy for the second
season and WIN and LOST, respectively. RESWIN9596 will take positive values for
the leading teams at the 1995/1996 season and RESLOST9596 will take negative
values for those teams losing in that season. We expect a negative coefficient for the
former variable and a positive coefficient for the latter because the closer the match
the more sending-offs are expected. However, in the ‘‘constant state of match spe-
cification,’’ we know the result at the end of the match. Hence, we are able to control
for the difference in goals between teams if the observation ending is the last minute
of the match. Thus, we include several interactive terms combining the difference in
250 Journal of Sports Economics 11(3)
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goals at the end of the match, the season dummies, and the result dummies
(DGDEND9495WIN, DGDEND9495LOSS, DGDEND9596WIN, DGDEN-
D9596LOSS) as well as their squared counterparts (DGDEND9495WIN2, DGDEN-
D9495LOSS2, DGDEND9596WIN2, DGDEND9596LOSS2). In the same way, we
include the interaction between the draw result at the end of the match and the season
dummies (DEND9495DRAW, DEND9596DRAW).
Finally, in the ‘‘minute by minute specification,’’ we include a dummy variable
that controls for the event of previous red cards in the match. This dummy variable
takes the value one if there was at least one sending-off in the match previous to the
minute under consideration. Likewise, we interacted this variable with the dummy
for the season 1995/1996. We expect that the occurrence of previous red cards
increased the likelihood of further sending-offs.
Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics for the entire sample while Tables 3
and 4 offer similar information for each season separately.
For convenience, we summarize our list of dependent and explanatory variables
below (in alphabetical order):
SENDING-OFFS (dependent variable): dummy variable that takes value one if
during the period there is a sending-off and zero otherwise.
ATTENDANCE: public attendance at the match measured in thousands.
D16-30: dummy variable that takes the value of one if the minute is equal
between 16 and 30 and zero otherwise.
D31-45: dummy variable that takes the value of one if the minute is equal
between 31 and 45 and zero otherwise.
D45: dummy variable that takes the value of one if the minute is equal to 45 and
zero otherwise.
D46-60: dummy variable that takes the value of one if the minute is equal
between 16 and 30 and zero otherwise.
D61-75: dummy variable that takes the value of one if the minute is equal
between 61 and 75 and zero otherwise.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics All Observations, N ¼ 4,258
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
SENDING-OFFS 0.08 0 1
TIME 36 27 1 90
LOSS 0.22 0 1
DRAW 0.56 0 1
WIN 0.22 0 1
RIVALRY 0.06 0 1
ATTENDANCE 22.97 16.94 1.58 99.27
D9596 0.57 0 1
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D76-90: dummy variable that takes the value of one if the minute is equal
between 61 and 75 and zero otherwise.
D90: dummy variable that takes the value of one if the minute is equal to 90 and
zero otherwise.
D9596: dummy variable that takes value one for the season 1995/1996 and zero
otherwise.
D9596DRAW: interactive variable between D9596 and DRAW.
D9596LOSS: interactive variable between D9596 and LOSS.
D9596WIN: interactive variable between D9596 and WIN.
DEND9495DRAW: interactive variable between DMEND, D9495, and DRAW.
DEND9596DRAW: interactive variable between DMEND, D9596, and DRAW.
DGDEND9495LOSS: interactive variable between DMEND, D9495, LOSS, and
the difference in goals at the end of the match.
DGDEND9495LOSS2: quadratic term of DGDEND9495LOSS.
DGDEND9495WIN: interactive variable between DMEND, D9495, WIN, and
the difference in goals at the end of the match.
DGDEND9495WIN2: quadratic term of DGDEND9495WIN.
DGDEND9596LOSS: interactive variable between DMEND, D9596, LOSS, and
the difference in goals at the end of the match.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for 1994/1995, N ¼ 1,838
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
SENDING-OFFS 0.07 0 1
TIME 37 27 1 90
LOSS 0.22 0 1
DRAW 0.56 0 1
WIN 0.22 0 1
RIVALRY 0.06 0 1
ATTENDANCE 24.12 19.88 2.75 99.27
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for 1995/1996, N ¼ 2,420
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
SENDING-OFFS 0.08 0 1
TIME 34 26 1 90
LOSS 0.22 0 1
DRAW 0.55 0 1
WIN 0.22 0 1
RIVALRY 0.06 0 1
ATTENDANCE 22.10 14.23 1.58 85.47
252 Journal of Sports Economics 11(3)
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DGDEND9596LOSS2: quadratic term of DGDEND9596LOSS.
DGDEND9596WIN: interactive variable between DMEND, D9596, WIN, and
the difference in goals at the end of the match.
DGDEND9596WIN2: quadratic term of DGDEND9596WIN.
DMBEGIN: dummy variable that takes value one if the observation belongs to
the beginning of the match.
DMEND: dummy variable that takes value one if the observation belongs to the
last 10 min of the match.
DMEND9596: interactive variable between D9596 and DMEND.
DPRED: dummy variable that takes the value one if there was at least one
sending-offs in the match previously the minute under consideration.
DPRED9596: interactive variable between DPRED and D9596.
DRAW: dummy variable that takes the value of one if the team is drawing and
zero otherwise.
HOME: dummy variable that takes value one if the team is the home team and
zero otherwise.
LOSS: dummy variable that takes the value of one if the team is losing and zero
otherwise.
PBEGIN: minute which begins the period of the observation.
RESLOSS9596: interactive variable between LOSS, D9596, and the difference in
goals.
RESWIN9596: interactive variable between WIN, D9596, and the difference in
goals.
RIVALRY: dummy variable that takes value one for either a match which is
played by geographical close teams or for a traditional match rivalry in the lea-
gue (i.e., Real Madrid vs. F. C. Barcelona) and zero otherwise.6
TIME: minutes elapsed without a change in the result.
TIME2: TIME*TIME.
WIN: dummy variable that takes the value of one if the team is winning and zero
otherwise.
Empirical Results
We use a probit model, in which we estimate the variance–covariance matrix of the
estimators assuming that the observations are independent across seasons, but not
necessarily within seasons. Table 5 presents the coefficients, marginal effects, and
the standard deviation of the marginal effect from the ‘‘constant state of match spe-
cification.’’ Table 6 presents the results for the ‘‘minute by minute specification.’’
Apart from those variables discussed above, we have also included dummy variables
for teams and referees.7
Looking first at pregame control variables, it is clear, from the significant and
positive coefficient on RIVALRY, that derby and other intense matches generate
Corral et al. / The Effect of Incentives on Sabotage 253
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increased probability of sending-offs in Spanish football thus reflecting that players
play dirtier in these intense matches than in other matches. This result is similar to
the findings of Witt (2005) for English Premier League and Buraimo et al. (IN
PRESS), for English Premier League and Bundesliga. Here, we find that a RIV-
ALRY match induces just over a 2% increase in probability of a sending-off. The
negative coefficient of HOME in all the estimations could reflect a less severe atti-
tude by the referees toward local teams and, hence, be the result of some positive
discrimination or bias.8 Attendance has no significant effect in line with Dawson
et al. (2007) and Buraimo et al. (IN PRESS).
All the timing variables have the expected coefficients. TIME has a positive mar-
ginal effect, suggesting that the longer the period of the observation, the higher the
probability that a sending-off takes place. However, this effect is positive at a
decreasing rate as captured by the negative marginal effect on TIME2. The interval
time dummies seem to show an increasing pattern. DMEND has a positive marginal
effect that is only significant in Model 1 of both specifications. In the final minutes
of the matches, there is a greater likelihood of a sending-off, 2.8% higher in the
Table 6. Probit Results (Minute by Minute Specification, N ¼ 151,200)
Coefficient ME ME Standard Error
INTERCEPT –3.84186***
RIVALRY 0.09670*** 0.00046 0.00002
ATTENDANCE –0.00104 –4.38E–06 4.52E–06
HOME –0.09187*** –0.00039 0.00001
DMEND 0.08702** 0.00040 0.00023
DMEND9596 0.14484*** 0.00074 0.00001
D16-30 0.27797*** 0.00158 0.00029
D31-45 0.58898*** 0.00484 0.00130
D46-60 0.48573*** 0.00352 0.00079
D61-75 0.74539*** 0.00744 0.00129
D76-90 0.71818*** 0.00693 0.00236
D45 0.27142*** 0.00173 0.00061
D90 0.42719*** 0.00348 0.00139
LOSS 0.21263*** 0.00107 0.00006
WIN –0.13329*** –0.00051 0.00001
D9596LOSS –0.05704*** –0.00023 0.00001
D9596WIN 0.17142*** 0.00088 0.00002
RESWIN9596 –0.03998*** –0.00017 4.45E-06
RESLOSS9596 0.05082*** 0.00021 5.66E–06
DPRED 0.05030*** 0.00022 0.00002
DPRED9596 –0.01330 –0.00006 0.00015
Log-likelihood –2,301
Notes: ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Models
include team individual effects and referee individual effects.
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‘‘constant state of match specification’’ and somewhat lower at 0.4% in the ‘‘minute
by minute specification.’’ Turning to our central hypothesis, the coefficient on
D9596END is positive and significant in all models in which it was included. The
likelihood of a red card at the end of game is higher still in the 1995/1996 season
regardless of the state of the match. Marginal effects are between 0.7% and 0.8%
in the ‘‘constant state of the match’’ specification and 0.07% for the ‘‘minute by min-
ute specification,’’ each higher than their 1994/1995 counterparts. Hence, higher
relative incentives for each victory combined with a decreasing expected cost of
punishable actions (as the end of the match approaches) leads to a significant rise
in red cards at the end of 1995/1996 matches. Finally, the extended time effect
captured by D45 and D90 dummies turns up in positive and significant marginal
effects for both variables in the ‘‘minute by minute’’ specification with impacts of
0.17% and 0.35%, respectively. Time added on by the referee at the end of second
half has a greater effect on probability of a sending-off than time added on at end of
first half.
If we interact the season effect and the match status variables, we find in both
specifications that the marginal effect on the D9596LOSS is significantly negative
and that on D9596WIN is positive and significant in all the specifications. Hence, in
1995/1996 with increased rewards for victory, losing teams are less prone to perpe-
trate sabotage. The marginal effect of losing on probability of dismissal in the ‘‘min-
ute by minute’’ model falls from 0.11% in 1994/1995 to 0.08% in 1995/1996. This
effect is also significant at the 1% level and can reflect the relative decrease in the
incentives for a draw in this season. In contrast, winning teams commit more
offenses that are punishable by red card and hence dismissal of a player, when the
three point system is introduced. The marginal effect of winning on probability of
dismissal is –0.05% in 1994/1995 and becomes positive at 0.04% in 1995/1996.
These results are in accord with Lazear’s (1989) hypothesis that increased relative
rewards are accompanied, in a contest environment, by sabotage. The sabotage in
our context is illegal activity designed to prevent an opponent overturning the win-
ning team’s lead in a match. Furthermore, we see that the marginal effect on the
dummy variable for the 1995/1996 season is not significantly different from zero
if we do not control for results (Model 3). Although this suggests no change in like-
lihood of (at least one) player dismissal, controlling for pregame and within-game
characteristics, we have seen that in fact this marginal effect hides an opposite effect
for wining and losing teams that compensate each other.
In Model 1, in the ‘‘constant state of match specification,’’ we also control for the
goal difference if the observation belongs to the end of the match. All these interac-
tion terms present the expected signs and are significant at 1% level, except the goal
difference (and squared) for losing teams at 1995/1996 season. These results are in
line with those of ‘‘minute by minute specification’’ captured by RESWIN9596 and
RESLOSS9596. In general, the larger the goal difference, the lower the likelihood of
a sending-off in both seasons. A final remark is that previous red cards in a match
lead to increase the likelihood of additional red cards.
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Conclusions
Lazear (1989) proposed that if rewards were dependent solely on relative perfor-
mance then an increase in rewards would induce agents to engage in activity to
reduce rivals’ output. We have tested this hypothesis using the natural experiment
of a rule change in Spanish football, the increase in points for winning a league
match from two to three. We find the following key results that are consistent with
Lazear’s hypothesis: First, teams in a winning position were more likely to commit
offences punishable by dismissal of a player (the red card issued by the referee) in
the three points reward than in the two points. Second, there is a higher probability of
red cards in 1995/1996 season as the end of the match approaches regardless the win-
ning position of the team.
There were no other changes in rules of football over the time period that we
investigate and also no reason to expect a change in application of the rules by
referees. Hence, monitoring and detection activity can be regarded as constant. In
addition, we have controlled for pregame and within-game influences on likelihood
of dismissal. Given the lack of other external conditions surrounding player dismis-
sals and given the presence of an appropriate set of control variables, we consider
our results to be supportive of increased sabotage behavior following the increase
in rewards for winning. The importance of relative rewards for winning for individ-
ual (legal) effort has been highlighted in a number of studies in individual sports
including golf, marathon running, and motor racing (see Frick & Simmons, 2008,
for a survey). Here, we find that increased rewards for winning spills over into
increased illegal activity, as observed and punished by football referees. Actual pun-
ishment for actions deserving a red card consists of players dismissals and this may
reduce audience enjoyment of games, either by making the contest more unequal or
by making it less interesting as the team with reduced personnel operates a more
defensive style of play. Therefore, the negative effects (sabotage actions) due to
incentive changes can aggravate if punishment are inadequate. However, a different
system of punishment to these sabotage actions could help to prevent or reduce
them. For instance, rather than dismiss players, a red card could be punished with
a penalty kick in spite of where the action has taken place. Alternatively, a ‘‘sin bin’’
could be introduced as in English Rugby League and the National Hockey League.
The welfare consequences of alternative types of player sanctions merit attention in
further research.
Notes
1. A well-known example due to its relevance is Materazzi’s provocative behavior toward
Zidane in the 2006 World Cup Final, which eventually led to Zidane to commit an act
of aggression that was observed by the referee and punished with a red card. Therefore,
for the Italian side, ‘‘sabotage’’ was successful and they were able to play against 10 men
for the rest of the final.
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2. Although football industry folklore claims that ‘‘10 men are harder to beat,’’ a number of
empirical studies find precisely the opposite (Caliendo and Radic, 2006; Ridder et al.,
1994; Torgler, 2004). These studies show that teams with 11 players have a greater chance
of winning against 10 players than 11. But obviously, the size of marginal effect of a red
card depends on the timing of dismissal and hence how much time there is left for the full-
strength team to exploit its advantage.
3. See Buraimo et al. (IN PRESS) for a similar finding for England and Germany.
4. In this case, because we are not able to control for the extra time, minutes 45 and 90 also
capture the extra time added on by the referee at the end of the first and second half,
respectively.
5. Buraimo et al. (IN PRESS), for England and Germany, and Witt (2005), for England, find
that derby matches are associated with greater incidence of player dismissals.
6. The full list of designated RIVALRY matches is F. C. Barcelona vs. Atle´tico de Madrid, S.
D. Compostela vs. Celta Vigo, Deportivo de la Corun˜a vs. Celta Vigo, Deportivo de la Cor-
un˜a vs. S. D. Compostela, R. C. D. Espan˜ol vs. F. C. Barcelona, Real Madrid vs. Atle´tico
de Madrid, Real Madrid vs. F. C. Barcelona, Racing de Santander vs. Athletic de Bilbao,
Racing de Santander vs. Real Oviedo, Rayo Vallecano vs. Atle´tico de Madrid, Rayo
Vallecano vs. Real Madrid, Real Sociedad vs. Athletic de Bilbao, U. D. Salamanca vs.
C. P. Me´rida, Sevilla C. F. vs. Real Betis Balompie´, Sporting de Gijo´n vs. Real Oviedo,
and Sporting de Gijo´n vs. Racing de Santander.
7. These estimates are available on request.
8. However, it could also reveal less aggressive behavior of home teams, although in line with
Garicano et al. (2005), we believe that this is a less likely explanation.
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